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Abstract 
Using data from the Philippines, we study the impact of mobile phones on the prices 
agricultural producers receive for their cash crop. We first look at the impact on price of 
mobile phone ownership at the household level. Because this masks a considerable 
amount of heterogeneity, we then look at the impact on price of the intrahousehold 
allocation of mobile phones. We find that whether the household owns a mobile phone 
has no impact on price, but whether a farmer or his spouse own a mobile phone is 
associated with a 5- to 7-percent increase in price. 
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1. Introduction 
The last decade has seen a rapid growth in the number of mobile phones in developing countries. 
In 1998, according to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), one individual in 20 
subscribed to mobile phones throughout the world. By 2008, that figure had climbed to almost 
12 individuals in 20, with developing countries accounting for almost two thirds of mobile-phone 
use in 2008 compared with less than half in 2002 (ITU, 2009). As a result, the mobile phone is 
the most rapidly adopted information communication technology (ICT) in the world.  
Over the same time period, mobile phones have spread from urban centres to rural areas as 
well as from the wealthy to the poor in developing countries (Aker and Mbiti, 2010). Moreover, 
mobile phones are often the only form of telecommunication to be found in rural areas of 
developing countries (Donner, 2008). Many individuals and households throughout the 
developing world have thus “leapfrogged” fixed-line telephone technology altogether in order to 
directly adopt mobile phone technology. 
For individuals and households in rural areas of developing countries, for whom the 
cultivation and subsequent sale of cash crops is often the only source of cash, the adoption of 
mobile phone technology can entail a reduction in the transaction (that is, information and 
search) costs associated with finding the trading partner who will purchase one’s crop at the 
highest price.1 By reducing the transaction costs associated with the sale of cash crops – farmers 
who own mobile phones can simply call potential trading partners instead of taking the time to 
visit them – mobile phone technology can stimulate market activity, especially in areas with poor 
transportation infrastructure. This leads to more efficient allocations of resources, which in turn 
allows economic policies to have their intended effects by reducing price distortions (de Janvry 
et al., 1991). 
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For these reasons, concurrently with the spread of mobile phones throughout rural areas of 
the developing world, there has been a sharp increase in the number of development agencies 
and organisations as well as in the scale of development projects and programs encouraging the 
adoption of mobile phones. For example, the Millennium Village Project (MVP) introduced 
village mobile phones to monitor health indicators (MVP, 2010). Likewise, Grameen claims that 
“mobile phones not only create a new business opportunity for the poor, [they] also bring access 
to information, market, health and other services to the remote rural areas” (Grameen, 2007). 
Lastly, new nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) such as MobileActive have emerged in 
response to the presumed beneficial impact of mobile phones on the poor, and the United 
Nations encourages the use of mobile phones as a means of achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals. 
Despite the hype surrounding mobile phone technology, however, the evidence on the 
impacts of mobile phones on the welfare of individuals and households is relatively scant. 
Within that literature, a good amount of attention has been devoted to the impact of mobile 
phone technology on traders and consumers (Overa, 2006; Aker, 2010). Indeed, although 
Commander et al. (2011) find that the use of ICT – defined as anything from some Internet and 
email use to the use of centrally automated and integrated production processes – increases firm 
productivity in Brazil and India, few studies have assessed the impact of mobile phones on 
producers.2 
We study the impact of mobile phone technology on agricultural producers by directly 
studying the relationship between mobile phone ownership and the price received by producers 
for a cash crop. More importantly, we study the impact of mobile phones at both the household 
and intrahousehold levels, first by controlling for whether the household owns a mobile phone, 
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and then by controlling for who within the household owns a mobile phone. We do so because 
even though the information obtained by way of a mobile phone is a club good,3 a mobile phone 
is itself a private good. As such, it may not always be possible for a farmer whose household 
owns a mobile phone to use the mobile phone to look for a better price if, for example, the 
mobile phone is owned by one of the farmer’s children – in this context, this also includes the 
adult children of the parents who still live at home – who does not accompany the farmer in his 
dealings with traders. 
Using survey data on farmers from three districts in Nueva Ecija, a landlocked province of 
the Philippines, we estimate the determinants of prices received by farmers for onions, the main 
cash crop in the survey area. Our findings suggest that mobile phone ownership at the household 
level has no statistically significant impact on the prices received by farmers. Rather, they 
suggest that it is the intrahousehold allocation of mobile phones that matters in determining the 
prices received by farmers for their onions. Our core empirical results indicate that mobile phone 
ownership by a farmer is associated with a 6-percent increase in the price received by the farmer 
for his cash crop. When removing price outliers, our results indicate that mobile phone 
ownership by the farmer’s spouse is associated with a 7-percent increase in the price received by 
the farmer for his cash crop. Ownership of a mobile phone by the farmer’s children, however, 
appears to be negatively associated with the price received by the farmer for his cash crop, 
although this relationship is not statistically significant at any of the conventional levels. These 
findings suggest that the intrahousehold allocation of mobile phones might very well matter for 
household welfare. 
Our approach, however, suffers from two important limitations. First and foremost, our 
results cannot be argued to be causal. Indeed, no feature of our research design can be exploited 
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to successfully establish the causal impact of mobile phones on the prices received by farmers in 
this context. Our data consist of household survey responses for a cross-section of farmers. As 
such, what we find is not a causal relationship but an interesting correlation that warrants further 
investigation aimed at assessing causality.4 The novelty of our approach, however, is to link the 
literature on ICT in developing countries with the literature on intrahousehold allocations 
(Thomas, 1990). As such, in suggesting how it is not whether a household owns a mobile phone 
that matters but rather who within the household owns a mobile phone, our empirical results 
suggest that in order to maximise policy effectiveness, development policy makers need to look 
beyond simple household-level mobile phone ownership.5 
Second, our empirical results rely on a relatively small sample of 95 observations stratified 
by mobile phone ownership at the household level. Although the households in our sample were 
randomly selected from within each stratum (that is, owners and non-owners of mobile phones) 
in each district, the relatively small size of our sample could undermine statistical confidence in 
our results. To remedy this, we conduct robustness checks in which the standard errors are 
bootstrapped in the online appendix, finding no qualitative differences as regards the impact of 
mobile phones between these and our core results, which instead rely on robust standard errors. 
 
2. Background 
This study is based on a survey of 95 agricultural households in three districts (that is, 
barangays) surrounding San Jose, the second largest city in the Nueva Ecija province of the 
Philippines.6 Located in the Central Luzon region of the country, Nueva Ecija is a landlocked 
province whose population attained 1.8 million people in 2007 according to National Statistical 
Office estimates (NSO, 2010). Nueva Ecija is also one of the largest rice- and onion-producing 
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provinces in the Philippines. As of 2002, it had the highest number of farms and the largest 
farmed area in Central Luzon, with 119,148 farms spread out across 196,390 hectares of land for 
an average of 1.65 hectares per farm (NSO, 2010). 
Although rice is the most important crop in Nueva Ecija, the analysis in this paper focuses on 
yellow onions for three reasons. First, unlike rice, which is a subsistence crop, yellow onions 
remain the most important cash crop in Nueva Ecija and around San Jose. Second, the price of 
onions is more volatile than the price of rice, which makes for an environment in which those 
with better access to price information are more likely to have a significant advantage over those 
who do not.7 Third, onions are a perishable crop, and a consistent finding in the literature on the 
impact of ICT in developing countries is that mobile phones have a greater positive impact on 
perishable than on non-perishable crops, since many farmers in developing countries lack the 
storage capacity required to smooth out price fluctuations (Deaton and Laroque, 1996; Overa, 
2006; Jensen, 2007; Muto and Yamano, 2009; Aker, 2010). Consequently, those with better 
access to price information are more likely to do significantly better in this environment.  
Farmers can sell their onions to traders or agents. Traders often hire agents to buy onions 
from farmers. Traders sell onions wholesale across different areas within a province or across 
provinces. For rice, farmers have the additional option of selling their rice directly to “buying 
stations,” or small warehouses mostly located in downtown San Jose. Onion sellers do not have 
that option and sell directly to agents or traders who come into town instead. Although the 
Walrasian model of economic theory posits that a given good will be traded at a unique price in 
equilibrium, there exist significant transaction costs for both sellers and buyers of onions, which 
wedge themselves between the market price of onions and the effective sales price received by 
onion sellers (that is, farmers) and the effective purchases price paid by onion buyers (that is, 
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traders or agents). As such, a farmer and an agent or trader transacting together form a bilateral 
monopoly, in which case the price at which onions will be transacted upon need not correspond 
to the perfectly competitive price of neoclassical economic theory. Indeed, the relative 
bargaining power of each party, the likelihood that a farmer and an agent will transact with each 
other in the future, reputational concerns, and other considerations may push the realised price 
away from that predicted by the Walrasian model (Fafchamps, 2004).8 
Lastly, we note that in the present context, a mobile phone is simply a device that allows one 
to make and receive calls as well as to send and receive text messages. The mobile phones used 
by our survey respondents are thus a far cry from the smart phones most readers will be familiar 
with. In other words, our survey respondents do not use mobile phone applications to track 
commodity prices. Rather, if they use their mobile phones to obtain better prices, they use them 
to talk to or exchange text messages with agents and traders. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents a list of the variables used in this paper along with a detailed description of each 
variable.9 Table 2 presents sample-weighted descriptive statistics. As regards our dependent 
variable, farmers receive on average a price of US$0.20 per kg of onions.10,11 The overwhelming 
majority of farmers in the sample are male, with less than 2 percent of farmers being female. The 
average farmer is 46 years old and has completed about eight years of education, which suggests 
that the average farmer in the data has received some secondary education.  
Before turning to household level variables, we note that Stinner (1977) reports that the 
statistical definition of household in the Philippines is 
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“a group of people who sleep in the same dwelling unit and have common arrangements 
for the preparation and consumption of food. (…) In most cases, a household consists of 
a related family group. (…) In most cases, a household may be taken to be the entire 
group of persons who customarily sleep in one dwelling unit. An exception, however, is 
that of two or more distinct family groups with independent eating arrangements who 
share one dwelling unit only for economy or for lack of housing facilities in the district.” 
 
Stinner also reports an average within-household ratio of nuclear family members to 
extended family members equal to 0.91 in rural areas, and that 92.1 percent of rural households 
in the Philippines consist of fewer than two nuclear families living under the same roof. Given 
the foregoing, it seems safe to assume that the children in our data are those of the farmer and his 
spouse and that those children live under the same roof as their parents. 
The average household is composed of about four individuals, about one third of whom are 
dependents.12 The average household cultivates 0.43 hectares of land. This includes land devoted 
to onions, rice, and other crops. In the Philippines, “smallholders” are defined as households who 
farm less than two hectares, which means that the average household in the data is a smallholder. 
The majority of farmers in the data cultivate either onions or rice but rarely both within a given 
season. In our data, the average farmer dedicates almost the entirety of his landholdings – 0.42 
hectares out of 0.43 hectares, or 98 percent of his landholdings – to onion cultivation. The 
average household had an income of about US$1,120 from non-onion related sources between 
January and May in 2010. 
Four different types of land ownership are observed in the data. A little over half the farmers 
in our sample own all of the land they farm. About a third of farmers, however, cultivate some 
land under a fixed-rent or share tenancy agreement.13 Likewise, a little under 15 percent of 
farmers own some mortgaged land, whereas about 3 percent are amortising owners of some land. 
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Almost half of the farmers in the data report that they are members of agricultural 
organisations, which we use here as crude measures of what Godquin and Quisumbing (2008) 
refer to as formal social capital (by opposition to informal social capital, which they defines as a 
respondent’s trust-based network) in the rural Philippines. These organisations can potentially 
give farmers access to cheaper inputs and loans at a lower interest rate than those acquired 
individually. Sometimes, the only form of formal loans is through group members. Rural banks 
tend to give loans to groups which are then responsible for disbursing smaller loans to their 
members. Organisations like farmer field schools can also give access to more advanced farming 
practice methods. Among the farmers surveyed, about one in 20 belongs to a cooperative, almost 
one in four belongs to an irrigator association, a little over one in ten belongs to farmer field 
school, and about one in 20 belongs to either a cooperative or to some other farmer association. 
Lastly, the farmers in our sample are distributed almost uniformly across districts. 
Turning to our variables of interest, almost half of all households in the data own a mobile 
phone, a figure that is consistent with the regional statistics discussed above. In the full sample of 
all households in the data, the farmer owns a mobile phone in 28 percent of cases, his wife owns 
a mobile phone in 13 percent of cases, and at least one of his children owns a mobile phone in 11 
percent of cases, respectively. 
 
4. Empirical Framework 
In order to study the impact of mobile phones on the output prices received by farmers in our 
data, we focus on two regressions of interest. The first regression is designed to study the impact 
of mobile phone ownership at the household level on price, such that 
 ln  =  +  +  + ℎℎ + 	,      (1) 
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where  is the price received by farmer 
 for his output,  is a vector of household 
characteristics,  is a vector of district dummies, ℎ is a variable equal to one if anyone within 
household 
 owns a mobile phone and equal to zero otherwise, and 	 is an error term with mean 
zero. 
The second regression is designed to study the impact of mobile phone ownership by 
controlling for the intrahousehold distribution of mobile phones, such that 
ln  =  +  +  +  +  +  + 	,    (2) 
where , , and  are defined as in equation 1; , , and  are dummy variables for 
whether the farmer, his spouse, or any of his children owns a mobile phone; and 	 is an error 
term with mean zero. 
In both equations 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the price 
received by the farmer rather than the price level. We take the logarithm of the dependent 
variable because prices are typically log-normally distributed, that is, the logarithm follows a 
normal distribution.14  
Not all the farmers in our data sold their onion harvest in a single transaction. Some of them 
reported two (n=23) or three (n=4) transactions. This unfortunately does not allow using farmer 
fixed effects given that individual characteristics – including mobile phone ownership at both the 
household and individual levels – would collapse into the farmer fixed effect. For those farmers 
who reported more than one transaction, we simply use the average onion price received as the 
dependent variable. 
11 
 
Both equations 1 and 2 are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard 
errors.15 In equation 1, the hypothesis test of interest is such that : ℎ = 0 versus 	: ℎ ≠ 0. 
In this case, a rejection of the null hypothesis in favour of  > 0 would suggest that the 
presence of a mobile phone within the household is associated with significantly higher received 
onion prices. Likewise, in equation 2, the hypothesis tests of interest are such that (i) :  = 0 
versus 	:  ≠ 0, (ii) :  = 0 versus 	:  ≠ 0, and (iii) :  = 0 versus 	:  ≠ 0. 
In this case, a rejection of any of the null hypotheses in favour of  > 0 would suggest that 
individual mobile phone ownership is associated with significantly higher onion prices. 
Lastly, in the online appendix, we also estimate a specification in which we control for 
household-level mobile phone ownership on the basis of observables. We do this in order to 
assess the robustness of our finding at the household level. In the first stage of this specification, 
we estimate the determinants of mobile phone ownership at the household-level by estimating a 
probit regression. In the second stage of this specification, we estimate the determinants of onion 
prices, replacing the dummy variable controlling for the presence of a mobile phone at the 
household level with the predicted probability of mobile phone ownership obtained from the 
first-stage probit instead of actual mobile phone ownership as a regressor. In what follows, we 
refer to this as the two-stage specification. 
 
5. Estimation Results and Discussion 
Before proceeding with the parametric empirical analysis discussed in the previous section, it 
may be helpful to begin the discussion of our empirical results with some simple nonparametric 
evidence so as to assess whether there exist unconditional relationships between the variables of 
interest (that is, mobile phone ownership at the household and the intrahousehold distribution of 
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mobile phones conditional on mobile phone ownership) and the outcome variable (that is, the 
prices received by the farmers for their onions).16 
 
5.1. Nonparametric Analysis 
Figures 1 and 2 in the online appendix present kernel density estimates of the distribution of the 
logarithm of the onion price. Table 3 presents mean onion prices by mobile phone ownership 
regime at the household level and, conditional on the household owning a mobile phone, at the 
intrahousehold level. In this case, note that the households who own a mobile phone do not 
receive a price that is significantly different than the price received by the households who do not 
own a mobile phone. Rather, it is the intrahousehold distribution of mobile phones that appears 
to matter: the households in which the farmer himself owns a mobile phone appear to receive a 
significantly higher price for their onions than the households in which the farmer does not own 
a mobile phone. This finding is reversed when looking at whether the farmer’s children own a 
mobile phone.  
 
5.2. Parametric Results 
The empirical results in table 3 do not control for confounding factors. Consequently, table 4 
presents estimation results for the determinants of the prices received by respondents controlling 
for farmer and household characteristics as well as for whether the household owns a mobile 
phone. The specifications in table 4 progressively build up the regression by focusing first on 
farmer and household characteristics (column 1), then by adding the farmers’ ownership status 
on the majority of his landholdings (column 2), and finally by adding crude measures of social 
capital and district fixed effects (column 3). 
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In this case, the household’s income and its landholdings are associated with higher onion 
prices, whereas the size of the households’ cultivated area devoted to onions is associated with 
lower onion prices. While the former results are unsurprising – higher incomes and larger 
landholdings are likely correlated with a better bargaining position – the latter finding is prima 
facie puzzling. Because the vast majority of farmers in the data tend to sell their onion harvest in 
one transaction given the fixed transaction costs incurred for each transaction, however, it is 
likely that the more onions a farmer shows up with at a meeting with a trader, the more likely he 
is to have to accept giving a price discount to the person he transacts with. This is perhaps 
because of a lack of storage facilities: given that onions are harvested simultaneously, farmers 
are likely eager to sell them as soon as possible. 
Whether a household owns a mobile phone has no statistically significant impact on the price 
received by the farmer for his onions. Although one might think that this could be driven by 
outliers, robustness checks (not shown) indicate that removing these outliers does not change the 
lack of significance of the household-level mobile phone ownership indicator variable. 
We move from the household to the intrahousehold level in table 5 by controlling for who, if 
anyone, owns a mobile phone within the household. Again, the household’s income and its 
landholdings are associated with higher onion prices, and the size of the households’ cultivated 
area devoted to onions is associated with lower onion prices. What does change in table 5, 
however, is the impact of mobile phones on the price received by the farmer: in all three 
specifications in table 5, farmers who own mobile phones appear to receive systematically higher 
prices for their onions. Computing the average marginal effect of mobile phone ownership in 
table 5,17 households for which the farmer owns a mobile phone received prices that were 
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respectively 5.3 (column 1), 5.8 (column 2), and 5.8 (column 3) percent higher than households 
for which the farmer did not own a mobile phone. 
Could these findings be driven by the presence of outliers in the dependent variable? Table 6 
progressively removes price outliers by keeping only the observations for which the onion price 
was less than 17 PhP (n=94), the observations for which the onion price was less than 12 PhP 
(n=90), and the observations for which the onion price was less than 11.5 PhP (n=89). In that 
case, although the intrahousehold allocation of mobile phones still appears to matter in every 
specification, the impact of mobile phones shifts from whether the farmer owns a mobile phone 
in table 5 to whether his spouse owns one instead in table 6. We discuss the possible reason for 
this change in significance in section 5.3.  
Computing the average marginal effect of mobile phone ownership in table 6, households for 
which the farmer’s spouse owns a mobile phone received prices that were respectively 7.3 
(column 1), 7.2 (column 2), and 7.2 (column 3) percent higher than households for which the 
farmer did not own a mobile phone.  
Tables 5 and 6 also present the results of four tests of equality of coefficients in order to 
determine whether the impact of mobile phone ownership is the same across individuals (that is, 
farmer, spouse, and children) and between pairs of individuals (that is, farmer and spouse, farmer 
and children, and spouse and children). Generally, the results of these tests indicate that the 
impact of mobile phone ownership is not equal across individuals. Likewise, mobile phone 
ownership by the farmer and mobile phone ownership by the farmer’s spouse have statistically 
indistinguishable impacts on onion prices. Both results are true whether one includes price 
outliers (table 5) or not (table 6). When outliers are included, mobile phone ownership by the 
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farmer and mobile phone ownership by the farmer’s children have significantly different 
impacts, but mobile phone ownership by the farmer’s children and mobile phone ownership by 
the farmer’s spouse have statistically indistinguishable impacts. These findings are reversed once 
outliers are excluded.18  
 
5.3. Discussion 
First and foremost, our findings call into question the public good nature of the information 
obtained by way of mobile phones. While it seems reasonable to assume that one mobile phone 
per household is sufficient for most social and business purposes, since individuals within the 
household can take turns using the phone, we find no significant relationship between mobile 
phone ownership at the household level and prices. This suggests limitations in the extent to 
which mobile phones are shared within households, even taking into account the fact that a 
household can own more than one mobile phone. While it is likely that the mobile phone is 
shared for some purposes such as contacting friends and family, our results indicate that they are 
not shared for the purposes of searching for better prices. Hence, different individuals within the 
household seem to own mobile phones for different purposes, and the information obtained by 
way of mobile phones is less of a public good than is usually assumed. 
Second, if indeed it is the case that mobile phone ownership by the spouse has a statistically 
significant impact but that mobile phone ownership by the farmer himself does not, this could 
suggest that mobile phones are a source of bargaining power within the households in the data. 
In cases where the farmer owns the mobile phone, it is possible that the farmer does not share 
price information with his spouse. Let us take for example a household in which the husband and 
wife are both responsible for farming but in which only the husband owns a mobile phone. In 
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this case, it is clear that the husband has an advantage in searching for potentially higher prices 
since he can do so more cheaply with his mobile phone. Both the husband and wife, however, 
have an incentive to control the mobile phone because the person who controls it will have better 
information about household income.19 Farmers may have an incentive to hide a portion of their 
income so that they have full control of it, especially if the preferences of the spouses are 
different from each other’s, a phenomenon extensively documented in the intrahousehold 
literature by evaluating impact of exogenous changes in income between men and women on 
child outcomes and household expenditure patterns (Folbre, 1984; Lundberg et al., 1997; Qian, 
2008; Rubalcava et al. 2009). Indeed, Ashraf (2009) notes that in the Philippines, husbands 
voluntarily hand over their income to their wives who then allocate the household budget in 
order for husbands to avoid unnecessary personal expenditures, such as those on alcohol. When 
husbands are given an opportunity to hide their income, however, they do so. There is even a 
distinct Filipino term – kupit – for this kind of behaviour, wherein a husband “drinks away” his 
pay on the way home knowing that he will have to turn over his money to his wife otherwise. 
Ashraf (2009) confirms this behaviour using a randomised research design. Access to a mobile 
phone for the purposes of price negotiations can thus be a source of control over household 
income, which is why the spouse’s mobile phone may have positive, significant impact that it 
has in table 6. This is all the more likely given that the marginal impact of mobile phone 
ownership by the farmer’s spouse is economically, if not statistically, significantly higher than 
the marginal impact of mobile phone ownership by the farmer himself. 
Third, our empirical results raise the question of why mobile phones are not reallocated from 
the children to the parents within the households who own a mobile phone.20 Indeed, if a farmer 
is aware that a mobile phone within his household will only be useful in securing better prices 
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for his crops if he is the owner of that phone, why would he not claim the phone for himself? 
This reasoning, while intuitively appealing, implicitly assumes that higher onion prices 
automatically mean higher welfare for the household or the individual farmer. It could very well 
be the case, however, that one of the farmer’s children has a mobile phone because she can make 
a better use of it in terms of welfare. As such, our finding should not be interpreted as evidence 
of anomalous behaviour on the part of the households we study.  
Lastly, our findings indicate that it may be advantageous for “ICT for development”-type 
(ICTD) interventions to target specific household members so as to maximise impact. Depending 
on the outcome, technologies can have heterogeneous effects on the household. In San Jose, 
Nueva Ecija, it is well-known that farmers have a competitive advantage in negotiating prices 
and generally have a more extensive buyer network, so it is no surprise that in our data, farmer 
ownership of mobile phones is associated with a higher sales price. In this context, there does not 
appear to be high educational or income barriers to using mobile phones since they are simple to 
use and relatively cheap, and the use of mobile phones is widespread even in rural areas. With 
more complex ICTD tools such as mobile phone applications, however, it may be important to 
target not just farmers, but those farmers can use the technology most effectively to maximise the 
outcome of interest. 
A good example in which the intrahousehold allocation of technology matters in conjunction 
with education is with the International Rice Research Institute’s Nutrient Manager for Rice Text 
(NMRice Txt) program in the Philippines. A free service, NMRice Txt helps farmers calculate 
the optimal fertiliser needs based on a set of responses that users enter about their plot 
characteristics corresponding to questions asked by an automated voice over the mobile phone 
(Nelson, 2010). When the service was tested in the provinces of Iloilo and Isabela, farmers who 
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had previously owned mobile phones and who knew how to make and receive calls and send and 
receive text messages struggled in using the new service, even with the aid of three video 
presentations on how to use the software, lectures by trained agricultural extension workers, 
visual demonstrations, and automated questions adjusted to the local dialect of the provinces. 
When farmers were asked if they would use the service in the future, most of them responded 
that they would have their children, who are more tech-savvy, use NMRice Txt (Nelson, 2010).  
There is thus some anecdotal evidence suggesting that mobile phone-based initiatives can be 
adopted more effectively if farmers are taught the intuition behind new farming practices while 
more tech-savvy members of the household are targeted for use. Labonne and Chase (2009), for 
example, find a significant correlation between educational attainment of the oldest child in the 
household and household mobile phone ownership. Likewise, the estimation results in appendix 
table A1 online indicate that in our data, more educated farmers are more likely to have access to 
a mobile phone within their household. Both these findings suggest that the presence of educated 
individuals in the household drives technology adoption in the household, similarly to how Basu 
and Foster (1998) show how the presence of a literate individual in a given household creates a 
positive externality for the illiterate members of the household, who become “proximate 
literates” as a result. 
 
6. Conclusion 
There exist important but distinct literatures respectively on the impacts of information 
communication technology on rural markets (Overa, 2006; Jensen, 2007; Donner, 2009; Labonne 
and Chase, 2009; Muto and Yamano, 2009; Aker, 2010; Aker and Mbiti, 2010; Klonner and 
Nolen, 2010) and on the impacts of intrahousehold control of income and bargaining power 
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(Thomas, 1990; Lundberg et al., 1997; Qian, 2008; Ashraf, 2009; Rubalcava et al., 2009). We 
link these two literatures by studying the hitherto unexplored impacts of the intrahousehold 
allocation of information communication technology.21  
Specifically, we study the impacts of mobile phone ownership at both the household and 
intrahousehold levels on the prices by agricultural producers. Using survey data on a cross-
section of onion farmers in the Nueva Ecija province of the Philippines, we find that the presence 
of a mobile phone at the household level appears to have no statistically significant impact on the 
price received by a farmer for his onions, but whether the farmer himself owns a mobile phone is 
associated with a 6-percent increase in the price received for his onions. 
Given the considerable amount of empirical evidence against the unitary household model 
(Alderman et al., 1995), according to which the individuals that compose a household can be 
aggregated into a single, stylised “individual” represented by a single set of preferences, there are 
good a priori reasons to believe that who controls a given technology within the household may 
matter. Our empirical finding – mobile phones appear to have a positive impact on prices, but 
only when the farmer or his spouse own the mobile phone within a household – calls into 
question ICTD-type policy interventions designed around the allocation of mobile phones at the 
household level (or worse, at the village level, as in the Grameen village mobile phones case). 
This is all the more important given the growing number of ICTD efforts. 
Given the nature of our data, however, our empirical findings cannot be argued to be causal. 
That is, we cannot exploit a specific feature of research design or a specific variable to establish 
the potential causal relationship that flows from mobile phones to agricultural prices. Rather, we 
find an interesting correlation between the intrahousehold allocation of mobile phones that 
appears too important for policy makers and researchers to ignore. Moreover, given our small 
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sample size and the fact that our data only focuses on one region of the Philippines, our results 
have little external validity. But given the growing importance of ICT in developing countries 
and in development policy, this correlation warrants further investigation so as to determine 
whether there is indeed a causal relationship between mobile phones and agricultural prices, and 
whether such a causal relationship holds broadly across developing countries. 
 
                                                 
1
 While we apply our argument to net seller households (that is, households who sell more of a 
given cash crop than they buy of it), a similar argument can be made for net buyer households 
(that is, households who buy more of a given cash crop than they buy of it), for whom the 
adoption of mobile phone technology can entail a reduction in the transaction costs associated 
with finding the trading partner who will sell a crop at the lowest price. See Key et al. (2000), 
Fafchamps and Hill (2005), and Bellemare and Barrett (2006) for empirical investigations of 
how transaction costs can impede market participation. 
2
 One exception is the paper by Klonner and Nolen (2010), who look at the impact of mobile 
phone technology on rural labour markets and find that employment increases substantially once 
a given area receives network coverage. Similarly, Chowdhury (2006) finds that access to 
landline phones increase rural factor market (land and labour) participation by about 14 percent 
in Bangladesh. 
3
 Although information is nonrival (that is, an individual’s consumption of a given piece of 
information does not preclude others from doing so), it is excludable (that is, an individual can 
preclude others from consuming a given piece of information by keeping it secret). It is in this 
sense that it is a club good.  
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4
 We also estimate a two-stage specification conceptually close to a propensity score matching 
(PSM) model to assess the robustness of our finding at the household level. Using this PSM-type 
approach does not allow making a causal statement, but it offers additional evidence in favour of 
our finding that the presence of a mobile phone at the household level does not affect the price 
received by the farmer. 
5
 The findings in this paper could thus be extended to those of other studies. For example, Jensen 
(2007) looks at the impact of mobile phones on the prices obtained by fishermen in India, but he 
does not look at who else might own a mobile phone within fishing households. Muto and 
Yamano (2009) look at whether household-level mobile phone ownership increases market 
participation, but they do not look at who owns a mobile phone within the household. Aker 
(2010) focuses on the impact of mobile phones on the prices obtained by traders in Niger, but she 
also does not look at who else might own a mobile phone within trader households. Futch and 
McIntosh (2009), for their part, look at the impact of village-level mobile phones in Rwanda on a 
number of measures, which neglects the impact of the allocation of mobile phones both within 
the village and within households. 
6
 The smallest administrative region in the Philippines, a barangay refers to a ward within a 
municipality. 
7
 Annual farmgate price series obtained from the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics of the 
Philippines indicate that the coefficient of variation (that is, standard deviation divided by mean) 
was 0.46 for dry paddy and 0.68 for yellow onions for the period 1990-2004 (that is, the period 
for which annual farmgate prices are available for both commodities). Similarly, the standard 
deviation of the dry paddy price series was equal to 1.77 PhP, whereas the standard deviation of 
the yellow onions price series was equal to 6.05 PhP. 
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8
 Likewise, it is in principle possible that a farmer might decide to sell his onions to the trader 
who offers the highest price on the basis of a telephone conversation and that the trader 
subsequently decides to hold up the farmer by reneging on his promised price once the farmer 
has incurred the transaction cost of meeting with the trader. Repeated interactions and 
reputational concerns should minimise the number of such occurrences, however. 
9
 The online appendix discusses sampling and the probability weights used in the empirical work 
below. 
10
 This price figure may seem low to those familiar with the context. Informal conversations with 
farmers suggest that in 2010, the year the data were collected, onion prices were indeed low 
compared to previous years. 
11
 At the time of writing, US$1 ≈ PhP 46. 
12
 A household’s dependency ratio is equal to the proportion of individuals younger than 15 and 
older than 64 years of age within the household. Thus, while household size is a rough measure 
of labour quantity within the household, the dependency ratio is an equally rough measure of 
labour quality within the household. 
13
 Because there was only one case of share tenancy in the data, we lump sharecroppers and fixed 
renters into a single “tenant” category. The four categories of land ownership do not sum up to 
one due to the ambiguous ownership status of some plots of land. 
14
 During preliminary work, we also conducted robustness checks in which we used the level 
instead of the logarithm of the price received by the farmer. The results of those robustness 
checks (not shown) were qualitatively similar to the ones presented in this paper. 
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15
 We conduct robustness checks with bootstrapped standard errors in the online appendix. The 
results of those robustness checks are not qualitatively different from those with robust standard 
errors as regards the impact of mobile phones on prices. 
16
 Although the means-comparison tests we present as part of our nonparametric results compare 
actual parameters, we use the term “nonparametric” in the sense that the evidence in this section 
is free from distributional assumptions. 
17
 The average marginal effects reported in this paper were calculated using the formula derived 
by Kennedy (1981) to calculate the marginal impact of a dummy variable in a semilogarithmic 
equation. Kennedy’s method improved upon earlier derivations by Halvorsen and Palmquist 
(1980). 
18
 An anonymous reviewer suggested we define a dummy variable equal to one if either the 
farmer or his spouse owns a mobile phone and use this instead of two separate mobile phone 
ownership dummies for the farmer and his spouse. As it turns out, in the specifications in which 
we use this new variable instead of two separate variables (not shown), the coefficient on the 
dummy variable for combined mobile phone ownership is not statistically significant. This 
unsurprising given that this new variable combines two variables, one of which has a statistically 
insignificant coefficient estimate. It thus looks as though it is individual (farmer or spouse) rather 
than parental mobile phone ownership that matters in this context. 
19
 Eder (2006) notes that women’s relationship to household assets is indirect in the Philippines – 
a woman’s access to household assets is mediated through her husband’s. Eder also notes that 
though there is a common conception that women in the Philippines prevail in roundabout ways 
over men when it comes to economic decisions within the household, his experience is that 
women often prevail explicitly and directly. Schmeer (2005) documents the fact that married 
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women use their control over economic resources to increase household spending on food in the 
Philippines. 
20
 Similarly, Udry’s (1996) finding about agricultural productivity differentials between men and 
women within the same households in Burkina Faso raises the question of why households do 
not reallocate plots from women to men.  
21
 This is not to say that the intrahousehold allocation of technology broadly defined has not been 
studied. See Peterman et al. (2011) for an extensive review of the empirical evidence on the 
gender differences in agricultural inputs, technology, and services in developing countries. 
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Table 1. Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
Price of Onions 
 
Average price received by the farmer for his or her onions, in 
Philippine pesos (PhP) 
Farmer Age Farmer’s age, in completed years 
Farmer Female = 1 if the farmer is female; = 0 otherwise 
Farmer Single = 1 if the farmer is single; = 0 otherwise 
Farmer Education Farmer’s education, in completed years 
Household Size Number of individuals in the household 
Household Dependency Ratio 
 
 
Number of individuals younger than 15 and older than 65 in 
the household divided by the number of individuals in the 
household 
Household Income 
 
 
 
 
Household income, in 1,000s of PhP. This includes from non-
onion farm-related income; income derived from livestock 
and poultry; income from off-farm labour; income from self-
employment; income from remittances; and other sources of 
income 
Household Landholdings Total amount of land owned by the household in hectares 
Household Cultivated Area 
 
Total amount of land under onion cultivation by the 
household, in hectares 
Amortising Owner  
 
= 1 if the farmer is an amortising owner on some of his or her 
lands; = 0 otherwise 
Mortgage Owner  
 
= 1 if the farmer is a mortgage owner on some of his or her 
lands; = 0 otherwise 
Tenant  
 
= 1 if the farmer is a fixed rent or share tenant on some of his 
or her lands; = 0 otherwise 
Owner 
 
= 1 if the farmer is the owner of all his or her lands; = 0 
otherwise, the omitted category 
Farmer Field School  
 
= 1 if the farmer is a member of a farmer field school; = 0 
otherwise 
Cooperative  = 1 if the farmer is a member of a cooperative; = 0 otherwise 
Irrigator Association  
 
= 1 if the farmer is a member of an irrigation association; = 0 
otherwise 
Other Farmer Association  
 
= 1 if the farmer is a member of a farmers’ association; = 0 
otherwise 
Household Mobile Phone  = 1 if the household owns a mobile phone; = 0 otherwise 
Farmer Mobile Phone  = 1 if the farmer owns a mobile phone; = 0 otherwise 
Spouse Mobile Phone  
 
= 1 if the farmer’s spouse owns a mobile phone; = 0 
otherwise 
Children Mobile Phone  
 
= 1 if any of the farmer’s children own a mobile phone; = 0 
otherwise 
District 1 = 1 if the household lives in district 1; = 0 otherwise 
District 2 = 1 if the household lives in district 2; = 0 otherwise 
District 3 = 1 if the household lives in district 3; = 0 otherwise 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (n=95) 
  Mean 
Variable (Std. Err.) 
Price of Onions (PhP) 9.393 
(0.133) 
Farmer Age (Years) 45.721 
(1.513) 
Farmer Female Dummy 0.015 
(0.011) 
Farmer Single Dummy 0.054 
(0.023) 
Farmer Education (Completed Years) 8.109 
(0.319) 
Household Size (Individuals) 4.075 
(0.162) 
Household Dependency Ratio 0.352 
(0.032) 
Household Income (1000s PhP) 51.460 
(9.150) 
Household Landholdings (Hectares) 0.430 
(0.040) 
Household Cultivated Area (Hectares) 0.420 
(0.030) 
Amortising Owner Dummy 0.031 
(0.019) 
Mortgage Owner Dummy 0.141 
(0.038) 
Fixed Rent or Share Tenant Dummy 0.300 
(0.050) 
Farmer Field School Dummy 0.111 
(0.036) 
Cooperative Dummy 0.070 
(0.028) 
Irrigator Association Dummy 0.235 
(0.047) 
Farmer Association Dummy 0.048 
(0.025) 
Household Cell Phone Dummy 0.470 
(0.050) 
Farmer Cell Phone Dummy 0.276 
(0.043) 
Spouse Cell Phone Dummy 0.134 
(0.031) 
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Children Cell Phone Dummy 0.112 
(0.028) 
District 1 Dummy 0.369 
(0.053) 
District 2 Dummy 0.280 
(0.049) 
District 3 Dummy 0.351 
  (0.054) 
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Table 3. Mean Onion Price Comparisons by Mobile Phone Ownership (n=95) 
Unit Mean Mean Significance 
Log of Onion Price 
Owns Cell 
Phone 
Does Not Own Cell 
Phone 
Household 2.240 2.220 
(0.020) (0.020) 
Farmer 2.270 2.210 ** 
(0.030) (0.020) 
Spouse 2.260 2.230 
(0.030) (0.020) 
Children 2.190 2.240 * 
  (0.030) (0.020)   
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4. OLS Estimation Results for the Determinants of Onion Prices 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Log of Onion Price 
Farmer Age -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Farmer Female -0.010 -0.008 -0.058 
(0.058) (0.063) (0.072) 
Farmer Single 0.075 0.075 0.054 
(0.114) (0.120) (0.134) 
Farmer Education 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Household Size -0.001 0.000 -0.005 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
Household Dependency Ratio 0.027 0.027 0.012 
(0.047) (0.048) (0.051) 
Household Income 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Landholdings 0.435*** 0.440*** 0.415** 
(0.116) (0.122) (0.171) 
Household Onion Area -0.492*** -0.496*** -0.428** 
(0.118) (0.121) (0.181) 
Amortising Owner 0.027 0.011 
(0.049) (0.053) 
Mortgage Owner 0.008 -0.001 
(0.037) (0.037) 
Tenant 0.001 -0.008 
(0.041) (0.040) 
Farmer Field School 0.026 
(0.034) 
Cooperative 0.069 
(0.048) 
Irrigator Association -0.048 
(0.036) 
Farmer Association 0.040 
(0.064) 
Household Mobile Phone 0.012 0.011 0.024 
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(0.028) (0.029) (0.030) 
District 2 0.078 
(0.058) 
District 3 0.074** 
(0.037) 
Constant 2.238*** 2.235*** 2.191*** 
(0.115) (0.129) (0.139) 
Observations 95 95 95 
R-squared 0.147 0.148 0.207 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5. OLS Estimation Results for the Determinants of Onion Prices Controlling for the Allocation of Mobile Phones 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Log of Onion Price 
Farmer Age 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Farmer Female 0.009 0.012 -0.043 
(0.065) (0.070) (0.081) 
Farmer Single 0.066 0.062 0.043 
(0.111) (0.120) (0.136) 
Farmer Education -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Household Size 0.003 0.003 -0.003 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
Household Dependency Ratio 0.008 0.007 -0.007 
(0.050) (0.052) (0.057) 
Household Income 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Landholdings 0.490*** 0.494*** 0.454** 
(0.125) (0.131) (0.186) 
Household Cultivated Area -0.551*** -0.556*** -0.469** 
(0.126) (0.130) (0.197) 
Amortising Owner 0.043 0.021 
(0.055) (0.058) 
Mortgage Owner -0.002 -0.012 
(0.036) (0.035) 
Tenant 0.016 0.006 
(0.040) (0.040) 
Farmer Field School 0.033 
(0.037) 
Cooperative 0.059 
(0.052) 
Irrigator Association -0.050 
(0.037) 
Farmer Association 0.023 
(0.058) 
Farmer Mobile Phone 0.052* 0.056* 0.057* 
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(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Spouse Mobile Phone 0.037 0.036 0.058 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
Children Mobile Phone -0.045 -0.051 -0.041 
(0.037) (0.040) (0.046) 
District 2 0.088 
(0.062) 
District 3 0.076* 
(0.039) 
Constant 2.225*** 2.207*** 2.161*** 
(0.116) (0.129) (0.137) 
Observations 95 95 95 
p-value (Farmer = Spouse = Children) 0.08 0.06 0.11 
p-value (Farmer = Spouse) 0.74 0.68 0.98 
p-value (Farmer = Children) 0.03 0.02 0.04 
p-value (Spouse = Children) 0.12 0.11 0.11 
R-squared 0.187 0.193 0.252 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
p-values at the bottom of the table are for tests of the null hypothesis that the relevant 
coefficients are not statistically different from one another. 
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Table 6. Robustness Checks on the OLS Estimation Results for the Determinants of Onion Prices Controlling for the 
Intrahousehold Allocation of Mobile Phones 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Log of Onion Price 
Farmer Age 0.002 0.003** 0.003** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Farmer Female -0.011 -0.005 -0.006 
(0.097) (0.080) (0.081) 
Farmer Single -0.078 -0.048 -0.049 
(0.090) (0.079) (0.079) 
Farmer Education -0.002 0.001 0.001 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Household Size -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Household Dependency Ratio -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 
(0.053) (0.052) (0.053) 
Household Income 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Landholdings 0.313** 0.297* 0.297* 
(0.144) (0.150) (0.150) 
Household Cultivated Area -0.318** -0.280* -0.280* 
(0.154) (0.161) (0.161) 
Amortising Owner 0.001 0.028 0.027 
(0.054) (0.049) (0.051) 
Mortgage Owner 0.010 0.023 0.023 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Tenant 0.030 0.031 0.031 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Farmer Field School 0.037 0.022 0.022 
(0.037) (0.033) (0.033) 
Cooperative 0.036 0.024 0.024 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Irrigator Association -0.052 -0.059* -0.059* 
(0.035) (0.033) (0.034) 
Farmer Association 0.005 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.055) (0.040) (0.040) 
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Farmer Mobile Phone 0.050* 0.039 0.039 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
Spouse Mobile Phone 0.071** 0.070** 0.070** 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033) 
Children Mobile Phone -0.049 -0.035 -0.035 
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) 
District 2 0.126** 0.103** 0.105** 
(0.050) (0.047) (0.051) 
District 3 0.088** 0.095** 0.096** 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) 
Constant 2.092*** 2.016*** 2.016*** 
(0.120) (0.095) (0.096) 
Observations 94 90 89 
p-value (Farmer = Spouse = Children) 0.06 0.14 0.14 
p-value (Farmer = Spouse) 0.63 0.42 0.42 
p-value (Farmer = Children) 0.04 0.11 0.11 
p-value (Spouse = Children) 0.03 0.05 0.05 
R-squared 0.272 0.309 0.285 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
number of observations diminishes so as to progressively eliminate possible dependent-variable 
outliers. In column 1, one observation, for which the onion price was 17 or greater, was 
dropped; in column 2 four observations, for which the onion price was 12 or greater, were 
dropped; and in column 3, one observation, for which the onion price was 11.5 or greater, was 
dropped. The p-values at the bottom of the table are for tests of the null hypothesis that the 
relevant coefficients are not statistically different from one another. 
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Appendix 
 
A. Data Sources and Construction 
Survey interviews were conducted between May and June 2010. Because the interviews were 
conducted two to three months after farmers sold their onions, this paper relies on farmer recall 
for the relevant information. Because respondents derive the majority of their livelihoods from 
agriculture, however, their recall of agricultural price information was very good.  
Farmer- and household-level data were collected with the help of enumerators trained by the 
Philippines Rice Research Institute. Within each district, about 30 households were selected. 
Because there are more mobile phone owners than non-owners in the population, households 
with no mobile phones were oversampled. In order to bring our sample as close as possible to a 
random sample, the empirical results in this paper incorporate sample weights computed using 
the sample and population proportion of household phone ownership and non-ownership. The 
latter proportions were obtained from the 2003 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (NSO, 
2006) for Central Luzon, the region where the province of Nueva Ecija is located. The Family 
Income and Expenditure Survey finds that 47 percent of the households in Central Luzon own 
phones. Although this percentage encompasses mobile and fixed-line subscribers, this is a good 
proxy for mobile phone ownership given that fixed-line subscribers only represented 4.7 percent 
of households (NSO, 2006). And while mobile phone subscription rates have increased 
dramatically, fixed-line subscription rates have stagnated in the Philippines. Thus, although this 
does not allow computing perfect sampling weights, it is the best available data on phone 
ownership. 
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The data are representative of onion farmers in the region we study, i.e., the rural areas 
around the city of San Jose, Nueva Ecija province, in the Central Luzon region of the 
Philippines. The data were collected by one of the authors as follows. In each barangay (i.e., 
district), the author obtained a list of households in the district administration and randomly 
selected about 40 households from that list. Due to missing observations, the estimation sample 
includes 36 households from the first district, 29 households from the second district, and 30 
households from the third district.  
 
B. Additional Results 
 
Additional Nonparametric Results 
Figure 1 presents a kernel density estimate of the distribution of the logarithm of the onion price 
received by each respondent. The value of this exercise is apparent in two ways. First, onion 
prices appear to be log-normally distributed in our data, which validates our use of the logarithm 
of onion prices as our dependent variable. Second, further investigation in figure 2, which 
disaggregates the results in figure 1 by presenting kernel density estimates of the distribution of 
the logarithm of the onion prices received by mobile phone ownership status, indicates that on 
average, the households who own a mobile phone appear to receive the same price as the 
household who do not own a mobile phone. Because of outliers, however, prices appear more 
volatile for the households who own a mobile phone than for the households who do not due 
own a mobile phone. It is on the basis of figure 2 that we conduct robustness checks that 
progressively exclude outliers so as to make sure that our empirical results are not driven by 
these outliers. 
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Figure 1. Kernel Density Estimate of the Distribution of Onion Prices with 
Epanechnikov Kernel and Bandwidth Equal to 0.1. 
 
Figure 2. Kernel Density Estimate of the Distribution of Onion Prices by 
Household Mobile Phone Ownership Status with Epanechnikov Kernel and 
Bandwidth Equal to 0.1. 
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Additional Parametric Results 
For robustness, we estimate a two-stage specification in which we control for each household’s 
propensity to have a mobile phone. Table A1 presents the result of a first-stage probit regression 
aimed at estimating the determinants of the likelihood that a household will own a mobile 
phone.1 Table A2 presents the result of a second-stage OLS regression in which the household 
mobile phone indicator variable used in table 4 has been replaced by the predicted probability 
that a household owns a mobile phone obtained from the probit specification in table A1.2 In this 
case, note that the use of this method does not change the qualitative result that mobile phone 
ownership at the household level does not seem to be associated with higher prices. When 
bootstrapping the standard errors (not shown), our results are qualitatively unchanged as regards 
the impact of mobile phones on prices. 
Tables A3 to A5 mirror the results in tables 4 to 6 in the paper, except that the results in 
tables A3 to A5 use bootstrapped standard errors instead of Huber-White robust standard errors. 
 
 
  
                                                 
1
 The indicator variable for whether the household head is female was dropped from the probit regression in 
appendix table A1 given that it perfectly predicts that a household will own a mobile phone. For the same reason, 
two observations were dropped in estimating the probit regression appendix table A1. 
2
 The probit regression in appendix table A1 made correct predictions in 73 percent of cases. That is, in 69 cases out 
of 95, the probit regression in appendix table A1 accurately predicted that a household that did not own a mobile 
phone would not own a mobile phone or that a household that did own a mobile phone would own a mobile phone. 
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Table A1. Probit Estimation Results for the Determinant of Mobile Phone Ownership at 
the Household Level 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: = 1 if Household Owns a Mobile Phone;  
= 0 Otherwise. 
Farmer Age -0.016 
(0.014) 
Farmer Single 1.532** 
(0.760) 
Farmer Education 0.203*** 
(0.068) 
Household Size 0.265** 
(0.124) 
Household Dependency Ratio -0.006 
(0.703) 
Household Income 0.002 
(0.001) 
Household Landholdings 1.209 
(2.134) 
Household Cultivated Area -0.488 
(2.190) 
Amortizing Owner 0.716 
(0.886) 
Mortgage Owner 0.193 
(0.416) 
Tenant 0.167 
(0.406) 
Farmer Field School -0.518 
(0.526) 
Cooperative 0.123 
(0.589) 
Irrigator Association 0.403 
(0.410) 
Farmer Association -0.248 
(0.673) 
District 2 -0.445 
(0.526) 
District 3 -0.625 
(0.485) 
Constant -2.336** 
(1.181) 
Observations 95 
Pseudo R-squared 0.285 
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** respectively denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Two observations were 
dropped because they perfectly predicted household mobile phone 
ownership. 
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Table A2. OLS Estimation Results for the Determinants of Onion Prices Using the 
Predicted Probability of Household Mobile Phone Ownership 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Farmer Age -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Farmer Female -0.005 -0.001 -0.059 
(0.059) (0.064) (0.077) 
Farmer Single 0.113 0.128 -0.024 
(0.120) (0.126) (0.166) 
Farmer Education 0.007 0.010 -0.012 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.017) 
Household Size 0.005 0.007 -0.017 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.019) 
Household Dependency Ratio 0.022 0.022 0.015 
(0.048) (0.049) (0.052) 
Household Income 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Landholdings 0.427*** 0.433*** 0.397** 
(0.120) (0.125) (0.173) 
Household Onion Area -0.466*** -0.464*** -0.427** 
(0.123) (0.130) (0.187) 
Amortizing Owner 0.057 -0.016 
(0.054) (0.059) 
Mortgage Owner 0.014 -0.010 
(0.038) (0.037) 
Tenant 0.006 -0.016 
(0.041) (0.041) 
Farmer Field School 0.048 
(0.046) 
Cooperative 0.060 
(0.047) 
Irrigator Association -0.070 
(0.050) 
Farmer Association 0.053 
(0.069) 
Household Mobile Phone -0.080 -0.117 0.191 
(Predicted) (0.096) (0.108) (0.230) 
District 2 0.098 
(0.061) 
District 3 0.109* 
(0.059) 
Constant 2.212*** 2.192*** 2.221*** 
(0.120) (0.139) (0.146) 
Observations 95 95 95 
R-squared 0.150 0.155 0.207 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Huber-White robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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Table A3. OLS Estimation Results for the Determinants of Onion Prices  
 Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Log of Onion Price 
Farmer Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Farmer Female -0.013 -0.013 -0.058 
(0.088) (0.084) (0.097) 
Farmer Single 0.107 0.116 0.085 
(0.121) (0.122) (0.142) 
Farmer Education 0.004 0.002 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Household Size -0.006 -0.004 -0.010 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
Household Dependency Ratio 0.019 0.016 -0.002 
(0.050) (0.053) (0.056) 
Household Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Landholdings 0.458 0.473 0.481 
(0.609) (0.317) (0.476) 
Household Onion Area -0.534 -0.542* -0.505 
(0.607) (0.317) (0.481) 
Amortizing Owner 0.045 0.029 
(0.059) (0.061) 
Mortgage Owner -0.005 -0.006 
(0.045) (0.046) 
Tenant -0.029 -0.030 
(0.040) (0.040) 
Farmer Field School 0.029 
(0.044) 
Cooperative 0.062 
(0.062) 
Irrigator Association -0.054 
(0.042) 
Farmer Association 0.081 
(0.088) 
Household Mobile Phone 0.010 0.008 0.026 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.035) 
District 2 0.079 
(0.055) 
District 3 0.084** 
(0.040) 
Constant 2.262*** 2.287*** 2.253*** 
(0.097) (0.122) (0.130) 
Observations 95 95 95 
Bootstrap Repetitions 1000 1000 1000 
R-squared 0.188 0.199 0.269 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table A4. OLS Estimation Results for the Determinants of Onion Prices Controlling for 
the Intrahousehold Allocation of Mobile Phones 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Log of Onion Price 
Farmer Age -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Farmer Female 0.004 0.001 -0.051 
(0.088) (0.097) (0.112) 
Farmer Single 0.096 0.105 0.080 
(0.118) (0.129) (0.142) 
Farmer Education 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Household Size -0.002 -0.000 -0.008 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) 
Household Dependency Ratio -0.007 -0.010 -0.025 
(0.054) (0.056) (0.065) 
Household Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Landholdings 0.527 0.536 0.523 
(0.448) (0.429) (0.665) 
Household Cultivated Area -0.601 -0.606 -0.545 
(0.449) (0.431) (0.667) 
Amortizing Owner 0.061 0.037 
(0.065) (0.066) 
Mortgage Owner -0.017 -0.020 
(0.044) (0.043) 
Tenant -0.010 -0.015 
(0.041) (0.042) 
Farmer Field School 0.041 
(0.049) 
Cooperative 0.048 
(0.067) 
Irrigator Association -0.058 
(0.041) 
Farmer Association 0.055 
(0.079) 
Farmer Mobile Phone 0.053* 0.054* 0.053* 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Spouse Mobile Phone 0.040 0.039 0.063* 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.038) 
Children Mobile Phone -0.037 -0.040 -0.029 
(0.040) (0.044) (0.054) 
District 2 0.092 
(0.061) 
District 3 0.086** 
(0.041) 
Constant 2.238*** 2.246*** 2.211*** 
(0.103) (0.124) (0.134) 
Observations 95 95 95 
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Bootstrap Repetitions 1000 1000 1000 
R-squared 0.231 0.239 0.308 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table A5. Robustness Checks on the OLS Estimation Results for the Determinants of 
Onion Prices Controlling for the Intrahousehold Allocation of Mobile Phones 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Log of Onion Price 
Farmer Age 0.002 0.003** 0.003** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Farmer Female -0.014 -0.015 -0.016 
(0.115) (0.096) (0.095) 
Farmer Single -0.050 -0.035 -0.036 
(0.097) (0.089) (0.084) 
Farmer Education -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Household Size -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Household Dependency Ratio -0.047 -0.043 -0.043 
(0.061) (0.058) (0.060) 
Household Income 0.000 0.000** 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Landholdings 0.365* 0.388** 0.388* 
(0.196) (0.197) (0.205) 
Household Cultivated Area -0.373* -0.369* -0.369* 
(0.205) (0.203) (0.214) 
Amortizing Owner 0.018 0.040 0.039 
(0.067) (0.061) (0.059) 
Mortgage Owner 0.008 0.026 0.026 
(0.038) (0.035) (0.038) 
Tenant 0.014 0.022 0.022 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.033) 
Farmer Field School 0.042 0.030 0.030 
(0.052) (0.044) (0.045) 
Cooperative 0.021 0.003 0.003 
(0.062) (0.060) (0.060) 
Irrigator Association -0.054 -0.065* -0.065* 
(0.038) (0.035) (0.034) 
Farmer Association 0.037 0.010 0.010 
(0.080) (0.050) (0.049) 
Farmer Mobile Phone 0.049 0.047* 0.047 
(0.031) (0.028) (0.029) 
Spouse Mobile Phone 0.077** 0.082** 0.082** 
(0.038) (0.036) (0.036) 
Children Mobile Phone -0.041 -0.027 -0.027 
(0.048) (0.044) (0.047) 
District 2 0.127** 0.109** 0.110** 
(0.052) (0.048) (0.049) 
District 3 0.095** 0.098** 0.098** 
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
Constant 2.125*** 2.070*** 2.070*** 
(0.120) (0.099) (0.101) 
Observations 94 90 89 
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Bootstrap Repetitions 1000 1000 1000 
R-squared 0.303 0.347 0.316 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
The number of observations diminishes so as to progressively eliminate possible 
dependent-variable outliers. In column 1, one observation, for which the onion price 
was 17 or greater, was dropped; in column 2 four observations, for which the onion 
price was 12 or greater, were dropped; and in column 3, one observation, for which the 
onion price was 11.5 or greater, was dropped.  
 
 
